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Abstract Advanced medical devices exploit the advantages of embedded soft-
ware whose development is subject to compliance with stringent requirements
of standardization and certification regimes due to the critical nature of such
systems. This paper presents initial results and lessons learned from an ongo-
ing project focusing on the development of a formal model of a subsystem of
a software-controlled safety-critical Active Medical Device (AMD) responsible
for renal replacement therapy. The use of formal approaches for the devel-
opment of AMDs is highly recommended by standards and regulations, and
motivates the recent advancement of the state of the art of related methods
and tools including Event-B and Rodin applied in this paper. It is expected
that the presented model development approach and the specification of a
high-confidence medical system will contribute to the still sparse experience
base available at the disposal of the scientific and practitioner community of
formal methods and software engineering.
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1 Introduction
With aging and the prevalence of noncommunicable diseases such as diabetes
and hypertension, the risk of chronic kidney failure is also increasing. At the
terminal phase of chronic kidney failure, renal replacement therapy is required
for treatment. One of the possible forms of this therapy is hemodialysis, also
known as “artificial kidney” treatment. It is a process in which using a pump
system, the patient’s blood is flowed through a special filter (dialyser) which
filters out the accumulated waste to be removed together with the washer fluid
at the other side of the dialyser. The machine responsible for this therapy is a
classical example of an Active Medical Device (AMD).
The council directive 93/42/EEC of the European Union (EU) concerning
medical devices [1] classifies any medical device as an AMD whose operation
depends on a source of electrical energy or any source of power other than that
directly generated by the human body or gravity and which acts by converting
this energy. Earlier AMDs were mostly based on hardware solutions. However,
lately embedded software has shown to have a determining impact on the
consumer value of AMDs and their competitive differentiation. Consequently,
according to the latest directive 2007/47/EC of the EU concerning medical
devices [2], a stand-alone software can also be considered as an AMD. The main
reason of this change is that software lends itself to adaptation to individual
requirements and requirements change clearly much faster than hardware.
As AMDs become more and more software-dependent, due to the immate-
rial nature of software, their certification becomes a crucial issue. Certification
regimes have responded to this issue by proposing various related interna-
tional standards such as FDA QSR, ISO 13485 [3], IEC 60601-1 [4] and IEC
62304 [5]. However, instead of containing actual recommendations for tech-
niques, tools and methods for medical software development, these standards
often encourage the use of more general standards and guidelines such as IEC
61508-3 [6] and FDA General Principles of Software Validation [7] as a source
for the selection of the appropriate software methods, techniques and tools.
One of the key recommendations of almost all of the standards is to adopt
formal methods for the development of software-intensive critical systems.
Their use is, in fact, “highly recommended” at higher Safety Integrity Lev-
els (SILs). The safety integrity of a system can be defined as the probability of
a safety-related system performing the required safety function under all of the
stated conditions within a stated period of time. Highly recommended means
that if the mentioned technique or measure is not used, then the rationale be-
hind this choice has to be justified during safety planning and assessment. IEC
61508-3 further states that the confidence that can be placed in the software
safety requirements specification, as a basis for safe software, depends on the
rigor of the techniques by which the desirable properties of the specification
have been achieved.
The overall aim of this article is to evaluate the possibility of application of
a refinement-based formal approach for the improved industrial development
of software-controlled safety-critical AMDs. In this case, improvement refers
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to increased reliability of medical systems. Specifically, we try to answer the
following two research questions: 1) is the refinement-based formal approach
suitable for modeling and analyzing all important elements of a complex AMD?
and 2) what are advantages and challenges associated with such an approach?
A formal model-driven development approach lets users build systems and
software that are correct by construction. The combined approach of require-
ments modeling and analysis based on techniques such as refinement, verifi-
cation and validation, and tools such as proof checkers, model checkers and
animation engines results in obtaining high-assurance and trustworthy AMDs.
The employed notions of formal verification and model validation are in full
accordance with the related standards such as IEC 61508-3 and IEC 62304.
To evaluate the applicability of the formal refinement-based approach, we
apply it to a hemodialysis machine [8], that is an AMD responsible for renal
replacement therapy, using the state-based formal method Event-B [9] and its
support platform Rodin [10]. The application is presented in this paper fol-
lowing the approach of conducting case study research in software engineering
advocated by [11].
The main contribution of this work is the obtained formal model that
demonstrates an example of the way in which the requirements of software
of modern AMDs can be rigorously specified through a chain of refinements
to represent the requirements at different abstraction levels. Additionally, the
paper leads to a software safety requirements specification that guarantees
correctness of the addressed aspects of behavior, supports verification of the
specification based on systematic analysis, avoids intrinsic specification faults,
and reduces ambiguities in the specification writing process by involving cus-
tomers in earlier stages of the development. It is a well-documented fact [12]
that the sooner an error is discovered, the lesser it costs.
The fact that the emerging role of embedded software increases the quali-
ty/cost ratio of AMDs is obviously advantageous for all the producers of such
equipment. It is, however, of especially high importance for Small and Medium
Enterprises (SMEs), which traditionally play a significant role in the medical
device industry and which are bound to be in the forefront of innovation with
their own products, as well as suppliers of larger companies. Innovation always
involves higher uncertainties. However, the responsibility of SMEs in reducing
the risk of the products to cause any harm is as high as that of any other
company. The rigorous approach described in this paper is consequently of
essential importance for SMEs in particular.
The ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) ad hoc
working group on risk assessment and risk management report [13] already
encourages SMEs to use formal paradigms for systems with medium or high
criticality for businesses. The survey performed by Woodcock et al. [14] that
examined industrial application of formal methods in 62 projects in the span
of 25 years also yielded several interesting results, particularly for SMEs. For
example, three times as many participants reported a reduction in development
time as reported an increase, five times as many projects reported reductions
in costs as reported an increase, and 92% of projects reported enhanced quality
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compared to other techniques. The improvement was attributed to better fault
detection (36%), improved design (12%), confidence in correctness (10%) and
better understanding (10%).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the rigorous approach
for modeling and analysis of high-confidence medical systems. Section 3 gives
an overview of the selected case study. Section 4 discusses the case study de-
sign including objectives, the research instrument and the model development
strategy. Section 5 first presents how the refinement-based approach has been
used to model various components of a hemodialysis machine and then pro-
vides a brief account of the analysis of the presented formal model. Section 6
presents the lessons learned during the model development activity. Section 7
presents some related work. The paper is concluded in Section 8.
2 Refinement-based model-driven development approach
The development of embedded software for AMDs is a complex process. The
degree of complexity often leads to an artifact that requires a great amount of
time, resources and attention to develop. However, proving its safe operation
is a challenging task. While guaranteeing the absence of mistakes in a piece of
software is not always possible [15], even the identification of their presence is
not an easy task. Traditional quality assurance techniques like code reviews or
test case generation are also not helpful in this case due to the critical nature
of the medical domain. Additionally, the lack of domain knowledge of software
engineers makes the matter worse [16].
We have proposed an approach where a system is synthesized using an
incremental refinement process synchronizing and integrating different views
and abstraction levels of the system. The process of quality assurance is em-
bedded in the model development. Every time a requirement is specified, it
goes to an internal consistency check. Once it is ensured that the requirement
is specified in the right way, it is also confirmed with the stakeholders whether
it indeed captures the desired behavior. The stakeholders, in this way, become
part of the development process right from the start and also the chance of an
error to trickle down in the later stages of the development is minimized.
As shown by Figure 1, our approach for the development of high-assurance
AMDs consists of three majors steps:
1. formal requirements specification,
2. their verification, and
3. their validation.
In the requirements specification step, informal user and system require-
ments are translated into a formal specification using a rigorous method. Dur-
ing this process, requirements are precisely written using mathematical and
logical structures which are amenable to formal analysis to determine their
correctness.
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Fig. 1 The triptych approach of formal development of AMDs
One of the important cornerstones of the specification process is the rep-
resentation of requirements at various abstraction levels using the notion of
refinement. Using this technique requirements are easy to specify, analyze and
implement. In this style of specification writing, requirements are added to the
model in a gradual manner. Ultimately, we have a requirements model that is
detailed enough to be effectively implemented.
Once the informal requirements have been translated into a formal spec-
ification, the next step is to make sure that they conform to the verification
standards, i.e., requirements are consistent and verifiable. During this process
it is verified that a specification conforms to some precisely expressed prop-
erties that the model is intended to fulfill such as well-definedness, invariant
preservation and guard strengthening in a refinement using standard verifica-
tion techniques.
According to [17], two well established formal verification approaches are
theorem proving and model checking. While the former refers to the reasoning
of defined properties using a rigorous mathematical approach, the latter is the
process of exploration of the whole state space of a model to verify dynamic
properties.
Both deductive theorem proving and model checking are important for
proving the consistency of an AMD. While theorem proving is helpful in en-
suring safety constraints of the system, model checking is effective in verifying
temporal constraints of the system such as liveness and fairness properties.
Once a requirement is specified and verified, the next step to consider is
its validation. It is a process where it is established by examination and pro-
vision of an objective evidence that the stakeholders’ requirements have been
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captured correctly and completely in the requirements specification document.
Verification alone is not sufficient to guarantee the correctness of the model be-
cause it does not check whether the specification documents the requirements
useful for stakeholders.
In order to make stakeholders understand the formal specification, we ani-
mate it. Animation is a process to demonstrate the fundamental operations of
a specification, using a dynamic and interactive graphical display. This tech-
nique is very well-suited for making a quick mental image of the model even
for non-technical domain experts. It is similar to rapid prototyping, however
during animation, a specification is executed without being translated into
code.
3 Case description
A hemodialysis machine is used when kidneys do not perform their functions
properly. i.e., removal of waste products from blood. It pumps blood from
the patient’s body through the arteries to the dialyser that functions as an
artificial kidney or a filter. Inside the dialyser, metabolic waste products are
separated from the blood. The dialyser operates as a filter that is divided into
two parts by a semipermeable membrane. On one side, the patient’s blood is
flowing and on the other side, the dialysate.
The dialysate, a chemical substance that is used in hemodialysis to draw
fluids and toxins out of the bloodstream and to supply electrolytes and other
chemicals to the bloodstream, is prepared by the hemodialysis machine for the
therapy. It consists of prepared water that contains certain quantities of elec-
trolyte and bicarbonate, depending on the individual patient’s requirements.
The concentrations of electrolyte and bicarbonate in the dialysate are adjusted
in such a way that certain substances can be removed from the blood through
convection, diffusion and osmosis, while other substances are added at the same
time. This is achieved mainly by diffusive clearance through the semiperme-
able membrane of the dialyser. The dialysate transports the metabolic waste
products from the dialyser into the discharge line. The cleaned blood is then
recycled back to the patient through the venous access. The working principle
of the hemodialysis machine is depicted by Figure 2.
The detailed description of the case study is available in [18].
4 Case study design
4.1 Objectives
The objective of this study is to evaluate the applicability of refinement-based
processes for improved embedded software development of active medical de-
vices. We want to determine whether this approach results in an increased
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Fig. 2 Working principle of hemodialysis machines
reliability of a medical device (demonstrable by proof) while having an effec-
tive grasp on the notion of verification and validation throughout its develop-
ment life cycle. With the employed rigorous model-based approach, the goal
is expected to be achieved. Thus, we wanted to investigate advantages and
challenges of the proposed approach, and evaluate the effects of implementing
it.
The concrete research questions for this study are as follows:
1. Is the formal model-based approach sufficient for modeling all elements of
a complex active medical device?
2. What are advantages and challenges associated with this approach?
4.2 Research instrument
We use the formal method Event-B [9] for model development. It is based
on Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice. It is the successor
of the B method [19] for the development of complex reactive systems. We
have chosen this method for the formal development of AMDs because of its
ability to represent systems at various abstraction levels using its refinement
mechanism, easy to use modeling notation and the extensive tool support.
The modeling language
A typical Event-B model is composed of two constructs: machines and con-
texts. Machines define the dynamic behavior of the model. A typical Event-B
machine includes:
– variables, which define the state space of the machine and can be expressed
using natural numbers, integers, real numbers, boolean, sets, relations,
functions or any other set-theoretical construct,
– invariants, which are used either to type variables or to constrain the state
space of the machine,
– variants, which are used to define the convergence property of events, i.e.,
they can be triggered only for a finite number of times. They are defined
using either a natural number or a finite set,
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– and events, which describe state transitions. An event is defined as a binary
relation composed of guards and actions. A guard is a predicate and all
the guards together construct the domain of the corresponding relation. An
action is an assignment statement to a state variable and is achieved by a
generalized substitution. Combined together, all actions form the range of
the corresponding relation. The actions of a particular event are executed
simultaneously and non-deterministically.
Contexts define the static elements of a model. They contain carrier sets,
constants, axioms and theorems. Carrier sets are used to define types. Axioms
are used to constrain carrier sets and constants. Theorems define properties
that are derived from axioms.
The refinement process
The Event-B method uses the refinement process to transform an abstract
specification into a concrete one. An Event-B model can be refined in several
ways:
– new variables and invariants can be introduced and existing invariants can
be strengthened,
– existing events can be refined to include and preserve new and existing
variables and invariants respectively,
– existing events can be split into several new events, and,
– completely new events can be introduced to the model.
A machine can be refined into another machine which then contains a more
detailed description of the model. A machine can see several contexts, i.e., use
the constants and axioms they contain. A context can also be further refined
into one or more contexts and can be seen by several machines.
The Rodin toolset
Rodin [10] is the tool that supports modeling and analysis in the Event-B
method. Rodin is built upon the Eclipse platform and is extensible by plug-
ins such as the model checking and animation plug-in ProB [20]. The main
tasks that are supported by Rodin are:
– specification of machines and contexts,
– their refinement, and
– their consistency checking by automatically generating Proof Obligations
(POs).
Proofs can be discharged either automatically, with the help of third-party
theorem provers, or interactively. Animation can be achieved by making sce-
narios and then making sure that events are being fired in the desired order.
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4.3 Model development and refinement strategy
During the requirements modeling process, following the advice of [21] to take
small refinement steps, we chose to introduce one requirement per refinement
level. Every refinement step introduces a new monolithic requirement of the
corresponding component into the model. The static data related to require-
ments is modeled in contexts and the general behavior of the system is pre-
sented in machines using events. The safety requirements are specified as ma-
chine invariants.
In order to improve the legibility of our requirements specification, as origi-
nally proposed by [22], we have classified our axioms into three groups: techni-
cal axioms, typing axioms and property axioms. This practice helps in distilling
the actual software requirements from technical expressions.
As the Event-B method lacks the explicit notion of time, we have used the
timing pattern for Event-B proposed by [23]. In this technique, N is used to
model the notion of time.
In order to conserve space, the shown refinements contain only the newly
introduced information instead of the complete model.
5 Case study report
5.1 Model development
The components of the hemodialysis machine we have chosen to demonstrate
as the case study in this paper belong to three different categories:
1. The first one is responsible for connecting the patient to the machine.
2. The second is responsible for monitoring the blood flow at set rates from
a patient’s arterial access.
3. The last one is responsible for maintaining the temperature of the dialysate.
5.1.1 The patient connection component
The connect patient component is responsible for establishing a connection
between a patient and a machine.
Abstract model
The abstract model is comprised of the following requirement:
The software shall monitor the blood flow in the Extra-corporeal Blood
Circuit (EBC) and if no flow is detected, then the software shall stop the
blood pump and execute an alarm signal.
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We first initiate a context (Context CCP0), as shown in Figure 3, that
contains the static data to specify this requirement. It has two sets: Blood-
PumpingValues which models the state of the blood pumping process (BP-
Started or BPStopped), and Alarms, which contains different types of alarms
of the system. The alarm ALM382 is related to this particular requirement. The
constant Null defines a state where no alarm has been triggered.
CONTEXT
CCP0
SETS
BloodPumpingValues, Alarms
CONSTANTS
BPStarted, BPStopped, ALM382, Null
AXIOMS
typ1 partition (BloodPumpingValues, {BPStarted}, {BPStopped})
typ2 partition (Alarms, {ALM382}, {Null})
END
Fig. 3 Context CCP0
The corresponding machine MCP0 specifies the aforementioned requirement
as shown by inv4 in Figure 4, i.e., if no flow is detected, then the software shall
stop the blood pump and execute the related alarm. The first three invariants
of the machine specify the typing of the variables. The last invariant states
that the blood pumping process also implicates the blood flowing process.
In order to capture the behavior of the system, the following events have
been introduced to the machine.
– The event INITIALISATION is the default event to initialize the values of
newly introduced variables.
– The event startBloodPumping is trivial as it is used to start the blood
pumping process.
– The event stopBloodPumping is also trivial as it just checks if the blood
pumping process is already started. If so, it stops this process and sets the
blood flow state as false.
– The event bloodFlowMonitoring actually specifies the monitoring process
of blood flow. If no flow is detected, then the action part of the event stops
the blood flow pumping process and triggers the related alarm.
First refinement
The first refinement includes the following requirement into the model:
The software shall monitor the filling blood volume of the EBC and if
the blood volume exceeds 400 ml then the software shall stop the blood
pump and execute an alarm signal.
Model-Driven Development of High-Assurance Active Medical Devices 11
MACHINE
MCP0
SEES
CCP0
VARIABLES
bloodFlow, alarm, bloodPumping
INVARIANTS
inv1 bloodFlow ∈ B
inv2 alarm ∈ Alarms
inv3 bloodPumping ∈ bloodPumpingValues
inv4 bloodPumping = BPStarted ∧ bloodFlow = FALSE ⇒
bloodPumping = BPStopped ∧ alarm = ALM382
inv5 bloodPumping = BPStarted ⇒ bloodFlow = TRUE
EVENTS
Event INITIALISATION
Then
act1 bloodFlow := FALSE
act2 alarm := Null
act3 bloodPumping := BPStopped
End
Event startBloodPumping
Where
grd1 bloodPumping = BPStopped
Then
act1 bloodPumping := BPStarted
act2 bloodFlow := TRUE
End
Event stopBloodPumping
Where
grd1 bloodPumping = BPStarted
Then
act1 bloodFlow := FALSE
act2 bloodPumping := BPStopped
End
Event bloodFlowMonitoring
Where
grd1 bloodFlow = FALSE
grd2 bloodPumping = BPStarted
Then
act1 bloodPumping := BPStopped
act2 alarm := ALM382
End
END
Fig. 4 Machine MCP0
To model this requirement, the context CCP0 is extended to CCP1 which
simply introduces the new alarm type, i.e., ALM344, related to this requirement.
The corresponding machine MCP1 at this level specifies the requirement
using the following invariant:
bloodPumping = BPStarted ∧ bloodF low = TRUE∧
fillingBloodV olume > 400⇒
bloodPumping = BPStopped ∧ alarm = ALM344
A new variable fillingBloodVolume is introduced to keep track of the
filling volume along with a new monitoring event fillingBloodVolumeMoni-
toring that is shown in Figure 5.
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Event fillingBloodVolumeMonitoring
Where
grd1 fillingBloodVolume > 400
grd2 bloodPumping = BPStarted
grd3 bloodFlow = TRUE
THEN
act1 bloodPumping := BPStopped
act2 alarm := ALM344
act3 bloodFlow := FALSE
END
Fig. 5 Event fillingBloodVolumeMonitoring
Second refinement
The second refinement includes the following requirement into the model:
The software shall use a timeout of 310 seconds after the first start of the
blood pump. After this timeout the software shall change to the therapy
mode.
The context CCP2 extends the context CCP1 by adding a new set Software-
Mode that is comprised of the following modes: Therapy, TherapySelection,
Preparation, EndOfTherapy, Disinfection.
The corresponding machine MCP2 at this level specifies the current require-
ment by the following invariant.
bloodPumping = BPStarted ∧ bloodPumpingT ime > 310∧
softwareMode = Preparation⇒ softwareMode = Therapy
Two new variables are added to the machine. The variable bloodPumping-
Time simulates the tick of the clock for the blood pumping process and the
variable softwareMode represents the current mode of the software.
Two new events are also introduced to model the functionality. Event tick,
shown in Figure 6, acts as a clock that ticks at regular intervals. Event change-
Mode, shown in Figure 7, is the event that is responsible for changing the mode
of the software from preparation to therapy after 310 seconds.
Event tick
Where
grd1 bloodPumping = BPStarted
grd2 bloodPumpingTime ≤ 310
Then
act1 bloodPumpingTime := bloodPumpingTime + 1
End
Fig. 6 Event tick
Event changeMode
Where
grd1 bloodPumping = BPStarted
grd2 bloodPumpingTime > 310
grd3 softwareMode = Preparation
Then
act1 softwareMode := Therapy
End
Fig. 7 Event changeMode
Model-Driven Development of High-Assurance Active Medical Devices 13
Third refinement
The third refinement includes the following requirement into the model:
The software shall monitor the blood flow direction and if the reverse
direction is detected, then the software shall stop the blood pump and
execute an alarm signal.
The context CCP3 extends the context CCP2 by adding a new set Blood-
FlowDirectionValues that are either Forward or Backward. The new related
alarm ALM737 is also added to the context.
The corresponding machine MCP3 introduces a new variable bloodFlowDi-
rection to monitor the direction of the blood flow. The requirement is then
specified using the following invariant:
bloodPumping = BPStarted ∧ bloodF lowDirection = Backward⇒
bloodPumping = BPStopped ∧ alarm = ALM737
The newly introduced event bloodFlowDirectionMonitoring, shown in
Figure 8, defines the monitoring event that checks the current blood flow
direction and if it is going backward, it immediately stops the blood pumping
process and triggers the related alarm.
Event bloodFlowDirectionMonitoring
Where
grd1 bloodFlowDirection = Backward
grd2 bloodPumping = BPStarted
THEN
act1 bloodPumping := BPStopped
act2 alarm := ALM737
END
Fig. 8 Event bloodFlowDirectionMonitoring
5.1.2 The blood pumping component
The blood pumping component is responsible for blood flow at set rates from
the arterial access of patients through the dialyser to their venous access.
Abstract model
The abstract model of the blood pumping component contains the following
requirement:
14 Atif Mashkoor
The software shall monitor the blood flow in the EBC and if no flow is
detected for more than 120 seconds, then the software shall stop the blood
pump and execute an alarm signal.
Like the previous component, we first initiated a context (Context CBP0)
that is exactly the same as the context Context CCP0 shown in Figure 3; the
same alarm is triggered in both cases.
The corresponding machine MBP0 introduces a new variable noFlowDetec-
tionTime that is used to simulate the behavior of a clock related to the blood
flow. The requirement is then specified by the following invariant:
bloodPumping = BPStarted ∧ noF lowDetectionT ime > 120⇒
bloodPumping = BPStopped ∧ alarm = ALM382
The monitoring event noFlowMonitoring, shown in Figure 9, specifies the
behavior of the model in case that no blood flow is detected for more than
120 seconds. The blood pumping process is then stopped, the related alarm is
triggered and the related clock is reset.
Event noFlowMonitoring
Where
grd1 bloodPumping = BPStarted
grd2 noFlowDetectionTime ≥ 120
grd3 bloodFlow = FALSE
Then
act1 bloodPumping := BPStopped
act2 alarm := ALM382
act3 noFlowDetectionTime := 0
End
Fig. 9 Event noFlowMonitoring
First refinement
The first refinement introduces the following requirement into the model:
If the system is not in bypass then the software shall monitor the blood
in the EBC and if the actual blood flow is less than 70% of the set blood
flow, then the software shall execute an alarm signal.
The context CBP0 is extended into CBP1 which simply introduces the new
alarm type ALM755 related to this particular requirement along with a constant
SetBloodFlow that sets the desired amount of blood flow in the system.
The corresponding machine MBP1 at this level introduces two new variables
into the specification. The variable actualBloodFlow represents the current
amount of flowing blood and the variable bypass represents the bypass state
of the system, i.e., the bypass valve is closed or not. The following invariant is
introduced for modeling the related requirement:
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bypass = FALSE ∧ actualBloodF low < ((7 ∗ SetBloodF low)÷ 10)⇒
alarm = ALM755
This refinement also introduces the monitoring event lessBloodFlowMon-
itoring into the model that is shown by Figure 10. It makes sure that the
actual amount of flowing blood does not fall short of its set amount. If this
happens, then it triggers the related alarm.
Event lessBloodFlowMonitoring
Where
grd1 bypass = FALSE
grd2 bloodPumping = BPStarted
grd3 actualBloodFlow < ((7∗SetBloodFlow)/10)
THEN
alarm := ALM755
END
Fig. 10 Event lessBloodFlowMonitoring
Second refinement
The second refinement includes the following requirement into the model:
The software shall monitor the rotation direction of the blood flow pump
and if the software detects that the blood flow pump rotates backwards,
then the software shall stop the blood flow pump and execute an alarm
signal.
This requirement is pretty much same as the requirement which we modeled
in the third refinement of the connect patient component. Hence, we simply
copy the same formalization into the model.
5.1.3 The temperature monitoring component
This component is responsible for monitoring the temperature of the dialysate
delivered to the dialyser. The dialysate preparation consists in mixing the
heated and degassed dialysate water with other fluid concentrates.
Abstract model
The abstract model of the temperature monitoring component contains the
following requirement:
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If the system is in the preparation mode and performs priming or rinsing
or if the system is in the therapy mode and if the dialysate tempera-
ture exceeds the maximum temperature of 41◦C, then the software shall
disconnect the dialyser from the dialysate and execute an alarm signal.
Like the previous components, we first initiate a context (Context CTM0)
that is shown in Figure 11. The first five axioms of the context are typing
axioms. The last one is specified to initialize the starting state of the dialyser
fluids, i.e., all the fluids are disconnected at the time of initialization.
CONTEXT
CTM0
SETS
Operations, DialyserStates , Fluids , Alarms, SoftwareModes
CONSTANTS
Priming, Rinsing , DialyserConnected, DialyserDisconnected , ALM377, Default, ALM639, Dialysate,
StartingDialysingState , Therapy, TherapySelection, Preparation , EndOfTherapy, Disinfection , Null
AXIOMS
typ1 partition (Operations, {Priming}, {Rinsing}, {Default})
typ2 partition ( DialyserStates , {DialyserConnected}, {DialyserDisconnected})
typ3 partition (Alarms, {Null}, {ALM377}, {ALM639})
typ4 partition ( Fluids , {Dialysate})
typ5 partition (SoftwareModes, {Therapy}, {TherapySelection}, {Preparation}, {EndOfTherapy},
{Disinfection })
tec1 StartingDialysingState ∈ Fluids → {DialyserDisconnected}
END
Fig. 11 Context CTM0
The corresponding machine MTM0 is shown in Figure 12. It contains sev-
eral variables whose typing is given by first five invariants. Invariants inv6
and inv7 specify the related requirement. The requirement is split into two
invariants because each software mode executes a different alarm if the fluid
temperature exceeds the limit of 41◦C.
Correspondingly, we specify two different events to capture the behavior of
the system. If software is in the preparation mode and the temperature of the
dialysate rises to more than 41◦C during the operation, then the event discon-
nectDialyserPreparation is triggered. If the software is in the therapy mode
while the same thing happens, then the event disconnectDialyserTherapy
is triggered.
First refinement
The first refinement of the temperature monitoring component contains the
following requirement:
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MACHINE
MTM0
SEES
CTM0
VARIABLES
dialyserState , dialysateTemperature , operation , softwareMode, alarm
INVARIANTS
inv1 dialyserState ∈ Fluids → DialyserStates
inv2 dialysateTemperature ∈ N
inv3 operation ∈ Operations
inv4 softwareMode ∈ SoftwareModes
inv5 alarm ∈ Alarms
inv6 softwareMode = Preparation ∧ (operation = Priming ∨ operation = Rinsing) ∧
dialysateTemperature > 41 ⇒ dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected} ∧
alarm = ALM377
inv7 softwareMode = Therapy ∧ dialysateTemperature > 41 ⇒
dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected} ∧ alarm = ALM639
EVENTS
Event Initialization
Then
act1 alarm := Null
act2 operation := Default
act3 dialyserState := StartingDialysingState
act4 dialysateTemperature := 0
act5 softwareMode := Preparation
End
Event disconnectDialyserPreparation
Where
grd1 softwareMode = Preparation
grd2 dialysateTemperature > 41
grd3 operation = Priming ∨ operation = Rinsing
grd4 dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserConnected}
Then
act1 dialyserState := {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected}
act2 alarm := ALM377
End
Event disconnectDialyserTherapy
Where
grd1 softwareMode = Therapy
grd2 dialysateTemperature > 41
grd3 dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserConnected}
Then
act1 dialyserState := {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected}
act2 alarm := ALM639
End
END
Fig. 12 Machine MTM0
If the system is in the therapy mode and if the dialysate temperature
falls below the minimum temperature of 33◦C, then the software shall
disconnect the dialyser from the dialysate and execute an alarm signal.
The context CTM0 is extended to CTM1 which simply introduces the new
alarm type ALM757 related to this particular requirement.
The corresponding machine MTM1 introduces the following invariant:
softwareMode = Therapy ∧ dialysateTemperature < 33⇒
dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected}∧
alarm = ALM757
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The model is further strengthened by the introduction of the event discon-
nectDialyserTherapyII as shown in Figure 13. It states that if the dialysate
temperature drops from 33◦C during the therapy mode, then the software
should disconnect the dialysate from the dialyser and trigger the related alarm.
Event disconnectDialyserTherapyII
Where
grd1 softwareMode = Therapy
grd2 dialysateTemperature < 33
grd3 dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserConnected}
Then
act1 dialyserState := {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected}
act2 alarm := ALM757
End
Fig. 13 Event disconnectDialyserTherapyII
Second refinement
The second refinement of the temperature monitoring component contains the
following requirement:
If the system is in the preparation mode and performs priming or rinsing
or if the system is in the therapy mode and the HemoDiaFiltration (HDF)
option is available and if the Substitution Fluid (SF) valve is opened
and if the dialysate temperature exceeds 42◦C, then the software shall
disconnect the dialyser from the dialysate and the EBC from the SF,
request bypass and execute an alarm signal.
The context CTM1 is extended to CTM2 as shown in Figure 14. It introduces
three sets, i.e., HDFValues, SFValveValues and EBCStates, and various con-
stants. Axioms typ1 to typ4 assign the constants to the sets. The last axiom
tec1 defines the initial state of the EBC.
The corresponding machine defines several new variables. The variable op-
tionHDF is defined to check the availability of the HDF option1. The variable
SFValveValue determines the opening and closing of the substitution fluid
valve. The variable EBCState determines which fluid is currently connected
to the EBC. The variable dialysateBypass determines whether the bypass
option for the dialysate has been selected or not. The following invariants are
also included in the model to state the requirement:
1 HemoDiaFiltration (HDF) is a process in which a high rate of ultrafiltration is used for
dialysis.
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CONTEXT
CTM2
EXTENDS
CTM1
SETS
HDFValues, SFValveValues, EBCStates
CONSTANTS
Online, Offline , Opened, Closed, SubstituitionFluid , CircuitConnected,
CircuitDisconnected , StartingEBCState
AXIOMS
typ1 partition (HDFValues, {Online}, {Offline})
typ2 partition (SFValues, {Opened}, {Closed})
typ3 SubstituitionFluid ∈ Fluids
typ4 partition (EBCStates, {CircuitConnected}, {CircuitDisconnected})
tec1 StartingEBCState ∈ Fluids → {CircuitDisconnected}
End
Fig. 14 Context CTM2
softwareMode = Preparation ∧ (operation = Priming ∨ operation = Rinsing)
∧optionHDF = Online ∧ SFV alveV alue = Opened∧
dialysateTemperature > 42⇒
dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected}∧
EBCState = {SubstituitionF luid 7→ CircuitDisconnected}∧
dialysateBypass = TRUE ∧ alarm = ALM377
softwareMode = Therapy ∧ optionHDF = Online ∧ SFV alveV alue = Opened∧
dialysateTemperature > 42⇒
dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected}∧
EBCState = {SubstituitionF luid 7→ CircuitDisconnected}∧
dialysateBypass = TRUE ∧ alarm = ALM639
Two new events are also added to the model. The event disconnectDial-
yserTherapyIII, shown in Figure 15, demonstrates how and when to dis-
connect the dialyser during the therapy mode when the temperature exceeds
the specified limit. The event disconnectDialyserPreparationII, shown in
Figure 16, demonstrates the same requirement for the preparation mode.
Third refinement
The third refinement of the temperature monitoring component contains the
following requirement:
If the system is in the therapy mode and the HDF option is available
and if the SF valve is opened and if the dialysate temperature falls below
33◦C, then the software shall disconnect the dialyser from the dialysate
and the EBC from the SF, request bypass and execute an alarm signal.
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Event disconnectDialyserTherapyIII
Where
grd1 softwareMode = Therapy
grd2 optionHDF = Online
grd3 SFValveValue = Opened
grd4 dialysateTemperature > 42
Then
act1 dialyserState :=
{Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected}
act2 EBCState :=
{ SubstituitionFluid 7→ CircuitDisconnected}
act3 alarm := ALM639
act4 dialysateBypass := TRUE
End
Fig. 15 Event disconnectDialyserThera-
pyIII
Event disconnectDialyserPreparationII
Where
grd1 softwareMode = Preparation
grd2 operation = Priming ∨ operation = Rinsing
grd3 optionHDF = Online
grd4 SFValveValue = Opened
grd5 dialysateTemperature > 42
Then
act1 dialyserState :=
{Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected}
act2 EBCState :=
{ SubstituitionFluid 7→ CircuitDisconnected}
act3 alarm := ALM377
act4 dialysateBypass := TRUE
End
Fig. 16 Event disconnectDialyserPrepara-
tionII
No new context is added to the model as no new static piece of information
is introduced by this requirement.
The corresponding machine introduces the following invariant:
softwareMode = Therapy ∧ optionHDF = Online ∧ SFV alveV alue = Opened∧
dialysateTemperature < 33⇒
dialyserState = {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected}∧
EBCState = {SubstituitionF luid 7→ CircuitDisconnected}∧
dialysateBypass = TRUE ∧ alarm = ALM757
To capture the behavior specified by the requirement, a new event dis-
connectDialyserTherapyIV as shown in Figure 17 is added to the model.
It specifies how the system should react in the therapy mode when the HDF
option is enabled, the SF valve is open and the temperature of the dialysate
drops below the minimum threshold of 33◦C. In this case both the dialysate
and the SF are disconnected, dialysate bypass is enabled and the related alarm
is triggered.
Event disconnectDialyserTherapyIV
Where
grd1 softwareMode = Therapy
grd2 optionHDF = Online
grd3 SFValveValue = Opened
grd4 dialysateTemperature < 33
Then
act1 dialyserState := {Dialysate 7→ DialyserDisconnected}
act2 EBCState := {SubstituitionFluid 7→ CircuitDisconnected}
act3 dialysateBypass := TRUE
act4 alarm := ALM757
End
Fig. 17 Event disconnectDialyserTherapyIV
Model-Driven Development of High-Assurance Active Medical Devices 21
5.2 Formal analysis of the model
A model is considered to be formally correct when it is both verified and vali-
dated. Verification of a model is achieved when it is proved that it is free from
specification errors and inconsistencies. This is usually done either through
the system of POs or through model checking. A proved specification ensures
that it is consistent, well-defined and its events preserve its invariants. How-
ever, proving a refinement requires to prove that concrete events maintain
invariants of the abstract model, maintain abstraction invariants, and, when
appropriate, decrease variants monotonically. Using model checking, we make
sure that states of a model are reachable, its formulas are satisfiable and it
does not contain deadlocks.
For our model, Rodin generated three kinds of POs: 1) invariants preserva-
tion, 2) well-definedness of guards and invariants, and 3) equality of a preserved
variable.
Invariants preservation relates to the condition that each variable affected
by the assignment statement must preserve the invariant. For example, the
event stopBloodPumping of machine MCP0, shown in Figure 4, using its guard
and both actions ensures that the related invariants inv2 and inv5 of the
machine are preserved.
The notion of well-definedness relates to the condition which leads to safe
evaluation of an expression. For example, the invariant of machine MCP1 states
a condition where the variable actualBloodFlow of type N is compared to an
expression of type R. However, as the value assigned to actualBloodFlow is
always of type N, well-definedness is provable.
Equality of a preserved variable amounts to proving that if a variable is
present in both the abstract as well as the concrete machine and an event of
the concrete machine assigns a (new) value to this variable, then it must be
proven that this value is consistent with the previous one. For example, the
variable alarm in all the machines is assigned with a new alarm, however all
the alarms belong to the same type, i.e., Alarms.
Table 1 expresses the proof statistics for our formal development using the
Rodin platform. These statistics measure the total number of generated POs,
automatically discharged POs by the Rodin platform, and manually discharged
POs. The development of components of the dialysis machine resulted in 106
POs, out of which 105 were discharged automatically. Only one PO required
manual interaction (only a few clicks). The employed approach of incremental
development helped us to achieve a high degree of automatically discharged
POs.
Validation of a model is achieved when it is demonstrated that the model is
free from requirements errors and reflects the stakeholders’ wishes adequately.
This can be done using several techniques, e.g., animation, review or walk-
through. The most common way to validate a specification in the Event-B
method is to animate the specification by invoking its operation semantics to
inspect its behavior. We create behavioral scenarios and execute them. It is
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Total Automatic Interactive
Patient connection 35 35 0
MCP0 8 8 0
MCP1 9 9 0
MCP2 10 10 0
MCP3 8 8 0
Blood pumping 25 24 1
MBP0 9 9 0
MBP1 8 7 1
MBP2 8 8 0
Temperature monitoring 46 46 0
MTM0 10 10 0
MTM1 6 6 0
MTM2 19 19 0
MTM3 11 11 0
Total 106 105 1
Table 1 Proof statistics
then examined whether the specification contains the desired functionality or
not.
For model checking and animation of our specification, we have used the
ProB tool [20] that supports automated consistency checking of Event-B ma-
chines via constraint solving techniques. Both model checking and animation
using ProB worked very well.
The ProB tool assisted us in finding potential invariant problems and their
improvement by generating counterexamples whenever it discovered an invari-
ant violation. It also helped us proving the deadlock freedom property of the
model. ProB may also help in improving invariant expression by providing
hints for strengthening invariants each time an invariant is modified or a new
PO is generated by the Rodin platform.
For animation, we created behavioral scenarios and executed them accord-
ingly. We mainly demonstrated that the system is behaving as per expecta-
tions, no unintended path of executions is permissible and there is no violation
of safety conditions by the specification. The resulting animation was easy to
follow, especially for non-technical stakeholders.
As a matter of fact, we corrected more errors during specification modeling
and reviewing than during discharging POs and animation.
6 Lessons learned
During the model development exercise, we made certain experiences which
are as follows:
– Formal models provide a consistent and complete repository of
requirements
The information presented in this paper as case study requirements does
not possess a one-to-one mapping from the requirements document to the
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requirements specification. In fact, the data related to requirements was
spread across several documents. For example, the alarm numbers were not
explicitly stated in the requirements. Mining the relevant data from these
documents is a time-consuming and tricky task. The broken or missing
links may sometimes lead to incoherent information that may impact the
correctness of the model. However, one of the advantages of the current
modeling exercise is also to provide a repository of adequate and consistent
requirements that will positively impact the development of software.
– Technical details impact the intelligibility of specifications
The original purpose of formal specifications is to model and analyze re-
quirements and design decisions in a way that leads to their systematic
transformation into correct software. However, during the specification
phase, sometimes we need to introduce additional constraints that are
necessary to discharge POs but are not part of the original requirements
document. Such technical elements impede the understandability of spec-
ifications for non-technical stakeholders. The practice of classification of
axioms as described in Section 4.3 not only increases the intelligibility of a
specification but also helps distilling software requirements from technical
constraints. The same procedure can be adopted for specifying machines.
The guidelines proposed by Kossak et al. [24] for writing understandable
formal specifications by using proper naming conventions and structuring
also help rendering specifications intelligible.
– There is no standard recipe for formal modeling
Formal modeling is an overly complex engineering task that cannot be
solved by applying some pre-cooked recipe [25]. Different formal develop-
ments may require different modeling solutions. Traditionally, refinement-
based development approaches follow a waterfall-like development struc-
ture where requirements are added to the model in a linear sequence. How-
ever, this practice does not suit well for large-scale model development
[26]. Therefore, diverging directions for model development are required.
We tried multiple modeling approaches for specification development. They
are as follows:
– Linear sequence development
We first tried the traditional linear sequence approach. We started with
one initial requirement and then continued enriching the model by intro-
ducing one requirement per refinement level. As expected, the model
started becoming complex, proofs started becoming complicated and
time consuming, and creating and running animation scenarios started
becoming tedious with every refinement step. After six refinement steps,
we reached a point where we decided that the model needs to be split.
This is due to complex interactions involved between every newly in-
troduced invariant and already existing events.
– Decomposable model development
The good thing about Event-B is that it provides means to decom-
pose a large model either based on shared variables (A-Style) [27]
or shared events (B-Style) [28]. The former approach decomposes a
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model in such a way that sub-models can contain shared variables.
However, the shared variables cannot be refined. For instance, a model
M = {v1, v2, v3} can be split into M1 = {v1, v2} and M2 = {v2, v3}
where v2 is shared. The latter approach decomposes the model in such a
way that sub-models have only distinct variables. For instance, a model
M = {v1, v2, v3} can be split into M1 = {v1} and M2 = {v2, v3} where
no variable is shared.
When we tried to decompose the dialysis machine model, we found
out that the variable alarm that is integral to the whole model cannot
be present and further refined in every sub-model at the same time.
So neither A-Style decomposition (although the variable alarm would
be present in every sub-model but could not be refined) nor B-Style
decomposition (the variable alarm would become part of only one sub-
model) work in our case.
– Atomic structure development
The next solution that we tried was the atomic modeling of compo-
nents; we modeled each component independently of the other compo-
nents. This approach works well so far. The modeling is easy, proofs are
straight forward and animation is quick. This is also the formalization
that has been presented in this paper as the case study. The prob-
lem, however, with this approach is that currently we do not know how
the components will interact with each other when they are plugged
together. This requires further investigation.
7 Related work
Like other safety-critical systems, medical devices also benefit from formal
methods. The use of formal methods has been in place for the development
of various health-care products for a long time. Several decades ago, Hewlett
Packard used HP-SL [29] to enhance the quality of a range of their cardiac
care products [30]. The University of Washington used the Z method [31] for
the development of a computer control system of a cyclotron and treatment
facility that provides particle beams for cancer treatment [32].
In recent years, the use of formal methods is escalating for the development
of software-intensive medical systems. For example, Osaiweran et al. [33] use
the formal Analytical Software Design (ASD) [34] approach for developing
the power control service of an interventional X-ray system. Jiant et al. [35]
present a methodology based on timed automata to extract timing properties
of a heart that can be used for the verification and validation of implantable
cardiac devices. Tuan et al. [36] provide a solution for the pacemaker challenge
using the model checker PAT (Process Analysis Toolkit) [37]. Me´ry et al. [38]
and Macedo et al. [39] present a model of pacemakers in Event-B and VDM
[40] respectively.
One of the medical devices relatively close to hemodialysis machines is an
infusion pump. It is primarily responsible for delivering fluids, such as nutrients
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and medications, into a patient’s body in controlled amounts. Arney et al. [41]
present a reference model of PCA (Patient Control Analgesia) infusion pumps
and test the model for structural and safety properties, Jose´ et al. [42] present
a formal model in MAL (Modal Action Logic) [43] that helps compare different
infusion devices and their provided functionalities, and Bowen et al. [44] use
the ProZ model checker [45] to test various safety properties of infusion pumps.
The formal basis for medical software components development we have
used in this paper is shared with aforementioned works. However, apart from
the work of Me´ry et al. [38], the verification and validation activities are better
integrated into our proposed development process as compared to others. We
cover a multitude of model analysis activities, e.g., model checking, model re-
view, and animation, that give us a grasp on the notion of correctness far better
than approaches which are comprised of only a subset of analysis techniques
we have employed. The work of Me´ry et al. [38], though based on Event-B, is
still different than our work because they use the refinement chart approach
for model development. It is a graphical modeling technique that provides a
view of different subsystems offering assistance in their later integration into
a single system. In contrast, our work is based on (different) conventional
modeling strategies, i.e., linear sequential, decomposable and atomicity, whose
semantics are well-defined and whose efficacy has been proven by several in-
dustrial success stories such as [46], [47], [48]. The system under development
is another difference; they work on pacemaker systems and our work is related
to hemodialysis machines.
According to the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance of appli-
cation of formal methods for the modeling and analysis of AMDs responsible
for renal replacement therapy such as dialysis machines. We believe that our
specification can act as a reference model that will inspire and facilitate man-
ufacturers of such systems to adopt the formal paradigm for the safe and
trustworthy development of variants of this domain.
8 Conclusion and future work
This paper addresses the formal development of safety-critical software com-
ponents embedded in AMDs. Ethics, as well as the necessity to comply with
standards and regulations, make it imperative to follow an approach that helps
in analyzing, specifying, implementing and testing such devices.
In this paper, we also report on a case study of model-driven development
of a hemodialysis machine, an instance of AMDs. Our conclusion regarding
the two research questions defined in Section 4 is as follows:
1. Is the formal model-based approach sufficient for modeling all elements of
a complex AMD?
The answer is Yes! Our employed approach successfully enabled us to spec-
ify and analyze various critical components of hemodialysis machines at
different abstraction levels. The formal Event-B method supported by the
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Eclipse-based open source Rodin tool has also lent itself to the develop-
ment of such systems. We have found Event-B an adequate method for the
modeling and analysis of critical medical devices. Its refinement principles,
and verification and validation mechanisms, provide all the elements that
are necessary for the safe development of AMDs.
2. What are advantages and challenges associated with this approach?
The apparent advantage of this approach is that we were able to ensure that
errors and omissions in requirements are detected and corrected close to
the point of their introduction. We were also successful in integrating non-
technical stakeholders in the earlier phases of development cycle by showing
them model animations and recording their feedback. The resulting formal
model also provided a repository of adequate and consistent requirements
that positively impacted the development of software. Last but not least,
we found the Event-B notation relatively easy to learn and use.
However, we also faced several challenges. For example, sophisticated tools
and elaborated guidelines for managing the complexity of growing models
by decomposition are missing. There is no implicit notion of time in Event-
B, that is necessary for an elegant expression of timing properties which
play a very important role in medical devices. Currently, we resort to ProB
for proving temporal properties of the system. In our opinion, a standard
and more natural way is required to specify and prove that temporal prop-
erties of the system are preserved by Event-B refinements. Finally, a tool
that is able to generate ready-to-deploy machine code from formal mod-
els is also missing. Currently available Event-B supported tools for this
purpose are clearly insufficient to produce code that can be deployed on
hemodialysis machines without any further human intervention.
We are encouraged to proceed with the further development of compo-
nents of hemodialysis machines. In future, we also plan to research on the
transformation of requirements models into ready-to-deploy code artifacts.
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